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INTRODUCTION
ore than half of the world’s countries do not explicitly
criminalize sexual assault in marriage,2 including OECD
countries like the Czech Republic and Japan. Certain U.S. states
either retain exemptions for sexual assault committed by
spouses or give it lesser penalties than other rapes.3 In some
countries, such as Tunisia, Cameroon, and Bulgaria, perpetra-
tors of rape are exempt from criminal charges if they marry the
victim. Sexual assaults committed against a spouse remain en-
tirely legal in thirty-five countries, including Sri Lanka, India,
Bulgaria, Kenya, and Malawi.4 When passing legislation to ad-
dress domestic violence in 2014, Lebanon not only declined to
criminalize marital rape, but legally entrenched a “marital right
of intercourse.”5 Clearly this is not a problem confined to one
area of the world, but is instead one affecting women globally.
2. Protecting Women from Violence, WORLD BANK GROUP,
http://wbl.worldbank.org/data/exploretopics/protecting-women-from-violence
(last visited Nov 2, 2015).
3. Jessica Klarfeld, Striking Disconnect: Marital Rape Law’s Failure to Keep
up with Domestic Violence Law, A, 48 AM. CRIM. REV. 1819, 1833–66 (2011).
4. Id.
5. Lebanon: Domestic Violence Law Good, but Incomplete, HUM. RTS. WATCH
(Apr. 3, 2014), https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/04/03/lebanon-domestic-vio-
lence-law-good-incomplete; see also Why Does Lebanese Bill on Domestic Vio-
lence Fail to Tackle Marital Rape?, GUARDIAN (Apr. 9, 2014),
M
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The human rights violations inherent in acts of violence
against women are now well recognized. Yet marital rape is a
particular form of gendered violence that has escaped both crim-
inal law sanctions and human rights approbation in almost one
third of the world’s nations. This silence in the law creates legal
impunity for men who sexually assault or rape women who are
their wives or intimate partners, thereby legitimizing this par-
ticular form of violence against women. This is a human rights
problem that cries out for redress, both legally and socially.
An examination of international law and human rights norms
demonstrates that state failures to criminalize sexual assault in
marriage breach the due diligence standard and fail to comply
with international human rights norms. The fact that there re-
main significant gaps in laws around the world ensuring legal
impunity for men who sexually violate their intimate partners,
indicates the global scale of the human rights law reform still to
be done in this area.
Research has shown that the majority of violence against
women is perpetrated by men known to the victims, who can be
husbands or common law partners. While domestic violence is
acknowledged as a human rights issue warranting legal inter-
vention, the extent of the specifically sexual component of vio-
lence against women in intimate relationships, including rape in
marriage,6 is drastically underrecognized. Sexual violence in in-
timate relationships has received relatively less attention in re-
search literature, in law reform efforts, and in human rights ad-
vocacy. It remains a human rights problem without sufficient
legal remedies.
State failures to criminalize marital rape represent a violation
of women’s fundamental human rights, including an undermin-
ing of women’s right to equal benefit of the law. Moreover, these
state failures to criminalize marital rape also represent a dere-
liction of a state’s duties to comply with international obligations
to enforce women’s legally protected human rights to equality,
liberty, and security of the person. These human rights are guar-
http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/apr/09/lebanese-bill-
domestic-violence-marital-rape.
6. The termmarriage in this article refers to a range of intimate relationships,
whether legally constituted or not, in which gendered violence can take place.
This article also uses a range of terms to describe sexual violence in intimate
relationships, such as spousal sexual assault, and sexual assault in marriage.
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anteed, most importantly, by the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and the Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW). Failure to criminalize marital rape further
represents a breach of the due diligence standard with regard to
violence against women.
From a rights-based approach, it is evident that international
human rights law and norms provide crucial forms of legal sup-
port for the kind of law reform and social change needed to end
marital rape. Chief among these reforms must be the criminali-
zation of sexual assault in marriage (and other intimate rela-
tionships), as the foundation for a meaningful strategy to end
this form of sexual violence in women’s lives. The criminality of
sex without consent cannot depend on the relational context.
Criminalization of sexual assault and rape in intimate rela-
tionships, therefore, must be undertaken as part of the broader
project of ending gendered violence, of developing effective legal
remedies for this gendered harm, and of living up to a state’s
international human rights obligations. This article’s specific fo-
cus is on the extent to which international law, human rights
norms, and other instruments can assist states in undertaking
the necessary efforts to end legal impunities for the sexual vio-
lation of women in intimate relationships.
Part I begins with an analysis and overview of the nature of
the problem of sexual violence in intimate relationships and de-
lineates some of its harms. In Part II, marital rape as an affront
to women’s fundamental human rights is explained, and the in-
ternational legal instruments that impose duties on the state to
protect women from gendered violence are identified. Part III
identifies the fundamental human rights violations that the
problem of marital rape presents and analyzes key legal and ju-
risprudential developments in each area. Finally, Part IV fur-
ther elaborates these arguments and explains that criminaliza-
tion of sexual assault within marriage and marriage-like rela-
tionships is a necessary, though not sufficient, strategy to end
this human rights violation affecting too many women through-
out the world.
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I. MARITAL RAPE AND THEHARMS OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN
INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS
In a great many countries there have been significant and pro-
gressive law reforms regarding sexual assault, accompanied by
an increasing public awareness of the problem. Yet, despite the
success of law reforms pertaining to sexual assault generally,
the particular issue of sexual assaults perpetrated against
women by their own husbands remains a relatively taboo and
misunderstood topic. This remains the case in spite of the ad-
vances made in recognizing domestic violence as a human rights
issue. Sexual violence in intimate relationships is still among
the more privatized and least remedied forms of gendered vio-
lence and an insufficiently recognized human rights problem.7
The next sections point to the ways in which the important
work to end domestic violence has not always paid sufficient at-
tention to the specifically sexual forms of violence against
women in intimate relationships.
A. Marital Rape is Less Recognized than Other Sexual Assaults,
and Not Identified as Domestic Violence
Much of the research and law reform on domestic violence in
intimate relationships tends to overlook the fact that many as-
saulted women are forced into unwanted sex by their physically
abusive partners. Kersti Yllö, a prominent researcher in the
field of gendered violence, observed some years ago that at “the
community level, as well as in the culture at large, efforts to
challenge the taken-for-granted ‘right’ of husbands to coerce
their wives sexually lag at least two decades behind our work on
physical violence.”8 Despite progress in some countries, this is
largely still the case in the vast majority of countries around the
world.
The focus on physical assaults, threats, and even emotional
abuse in domestic violence research, advocacy, public education,
7. See generally, DIANA E.H. RUSSELL, RAPE IN MARRIAGE (1982); DAVID
FINKELHOR &KERSTI YLLÖ., LICENSE TO RAPE: SEXUAL ABUSE OFWIVES (1987);
T.K. Logan, Robert Walker & Jennifer Cole, Silenced Suffering The Need for a
Better Understanding of Partner Sexual Violence, 16 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE &
ABUSE 111 (2015).
8. Kersti Yllö, The Silence Surrounding Sexual Violence: The Issue of Mar-
ital Rape and the Challenges It Poses for the Duluth Model, in COORDINATING
COMMUNITY RESPONSES TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: LESSONS FROM DULUTH AND
BEYOND 223, 225 (Melanie F. Shepard & Ellen Pence eds., 1999).
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and law reform tends to obscure the fact that in too many cases,
sexual violence9 is also a component of the violence in intimate
relationships between men and women. Sexual assault in mar-
riage can often involve significant harms and injuries, both psy-
chological and physical.10 Forced or coerced sex in intimate rela-
tionships, however, does not necessarily require physical aggres-
sion or violence to be accomplished. Indeed, some assaulted
women report acquiescing to unwanted and coerced sex with
their abusive male intimate partners, precisely to avoid episodes
of physical violence.11
Early research and advocacy on sexual assault and rape fo-
cused largely on “stranger” or “acquaintance” rape, leaving the
issue of sexual assault in the context of intimate relationships
relatively unexplored and certainly under acknowledged.12 Yet
research has repeatedly demonstrated that, contrary to the dom-
inant myth of the stranger assailant, the vast majority of sexual
assaults take place in the context of some kind of relationship,
and often some kind of ongoing and/or intimate relationship.
More specifically, “sexual assault committed in familiar settings
by assailants known to the victim, including spouses, occur at a
greater frequency than those committed in high risk situations
by unknown assailants.”13
Notions of “privacy” continue to surround the problem of sex-
ual assault in intimate relationships, and even when domestic
violence is acknowledged as a social problem, marital rape tends
9. WORLD HEALTH ORG., WORLD REPORT ON VIOLENCE AND HEALTH 149
(Etienne G. Krug et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter WHO REPORT]. The World
Health Organization (WHO) defines sexual violence as “any sexual act, at-
tempt to obtain a sexual act, unwanted sexual comments or advances, or acts
to traffic, or otherwise directed, against a person’s sexuality using coercion, by
any person regardless of their relationship to the victim, in any setting, includ-
ing but not limited to home and work.” Id.
10. See Patricia Easteal,Marital Rape: Conflicting Constructions of Reality,
WOMEN AGAINST VIOLENCE, Nov. 1997, at 23.
11. See Melanie Randall, Agency and (in)subordination Victimization, Re-
sistance and Sexual Violence in Women’s Lives 42, ch. 5 (1996) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, York University) (on file with author).
12. The term “intimate relationships” includes but is not limited only to (le-
gal and common law) spousal relationships. It also includes dating relation-
ships and ongoing intimate relationships that do not involve cohabitation.
13. Lana Stermac, Gianetta Del Bove &Mary Addison, Violence, Injury, and
Presentation Patterns in Spousal Sexual Assaults, 7 VIOLENCEAGAINSTWOMEN
1218, 1218 (2001).
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not to be identified as part of it. For example, a survey of com-
munity attitudes undertaken in Australia demonstrated that
very few of those surveyed “spontaneously identified sexual as-
sault or rape as an element of domestic violence.”14 Even when
the more well recognized forms of domestic violence were nomi-
nated, such as physical violence or battering, “sexual violence
was only identified by 12 percent of respondents when further
pressed about what “other forms” of domestic violence there
might be.”15 Ultimately, the researchers note that “people sur-
veyed were more inclined to describe domestic violence as verbal
abuse, mental abuse, and violence against children before they
turned their minds to the possibility of sexual assault.”16
Research in the field has also repeatedly documented that peo-
ple’s perceptions of the prevalence, seriousness, and conse-
quences of sexual violence are clearly linked to the relational
context in which it takes place. The closer the relationship be-
tween perpetrator and victim, the more diminished the clarity
about its wrongfulness.17 Other research documenting popular
perceptions about rape (depending on the relationship between
the perpetrator and the victim) demonstrates a definite ten-
dency to underplay the harm of sexual assault in the context of
intimate relationships because of the tendency to fixate on
“stranger rapes” as the more serious problem.18 One study spe-
cifically found that “participants rated a rape between more
14. Melanie Heenan, Austrl. Ctr. for the Study of Sexual Assault, Just
“Keeping the Peace”: A Reluctance to Respond to Male Partner Sexual Violence,
ISSUES 1, Mar. 2004, at 2, http://www.aifs.gov.au/acssa/pubs/issue/i1.html (ref-
erencing the report of Australia’s Office of the Status of Women’s report enti-
tled “Community Attitudes to Violence Against Women”).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., Jennifer A. Bennice & Patricia A. Resick,Marital Rape History,
Research, and Practice, 4 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE&ABUSE 228, 246 (2003).
18. This trend is evident in a recent study that assessed popular opinions
about rape in the context of marriage. Research participants were presented
with a variety of scenarios depicting sexual contact and then asked whether
they defined each of these situations as constituting a rape. In each scenario,
the perpetrator was a husband and the victim was his wife. When asked
whether having vaginal intercourse with one’s wife without her consent was
rape, 74 percent of those surveyed answered in the affirmative. However, when
the same scenario was modified to include the husband’s use of physical force,
an overwhelming 93 percent of respondents replied that the scenario consti-
tuted rape. Without the presence of physical violence, more people had diffi-
culty recognizing sexual assault in a spousal relationship than they did when
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closely acquainted people as less serious than stranger rape.”19
Moreover, the same study concluded that “[marital rape] is min-
imized somewhat in terms of seriousness in contrast to other
types of rape.”20
Stranger perpetrated sexual violence, therefore, tends to be
seen as more “serious,” more harmful, and definitely more crim-
inal, than sexual violence perpetrated in intimate relationships.
One set of researchers, in reviewing previous research and by
conducting their own study, observed that “knowing that the
perpetrator and victim are spouses was shown to alter beliefs
about both parties involved in conflictual interactions.”21 They
continue to suggest that “these findings imply that judges, ju-
rors, and other individuals who hear reports of violence may also
make different attributions about violence on the basis of the
victim-perpetrator relationship.”22
This underlines the point that popular misconceptions about
what sexual assault involves, what it looks like, and where it is
most likely to happen, tend to distort the subtleties and intrica-
cies that characterize the crime of spousal sexual assault. Fur-
thermore, these popular misconceptions also contribute to the
context in which disclosures are often inhibited and adequate
remedies are often not provided. In countries where the criminal
exemption for marital rape has long been repudiated, even
judges struggle to correctly apply the criminal law of sexual as-
sault and consent to cases involving spouses.23 This struggle
demonstrates that amending laws is only one step forward in a
the sex was accompanied by physical assault. Mary Kay Kirkwood & Dawn K.
Cecil, Marital Rape: A Student Assessment of Rape Laws and the Marital Ex-
emption, 7 VIOLENCE AGAINSTWOMEN 1234, 1245–48 (2001).
19. Kelly Simonson & Linda Mezydlo Subich, Rape Perceptions as a Func-
tion of Gender-Role Traditionality and Victim-Perpetrator Association, 40 SEX
ROLES 617, 629 (1999).
20. Id. at 630.
21. Jennifer Langhinrichsen-Rohling et al., Attributions About Perpetrators
and Victims of Interpersonal Abuse Results From an Analogue Study, 19 J.
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 484, 493 (2004).
22. Id. at 496; see Melanie Randall, Sexual Assault in Spousal Relation-
ships, Continuous Consent, and the Law: Honest but Mistaken Judicial Beliefs,
32 MAN. L.J. 144 (2006) (discussing the conceptual difficulties and legally
flawed analyses in Canadian cases on sexual assaults perpetrated in intimate
relationships where judges wrongly presumed that the relational context is
relevant in determining sexual assault and that the test for consent differs in
an ongoing intimate relationship).
23. Id.
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longer and more complicated process of social change to protect
human rights.
B. Sexual Assault in Intimate Relationships as a Form of Do-
mestic Violence
“There is not a single incident, it was almost a normal pattern.
I never had the option of saying no . . . .”24
“So what is marital rape like? Anyone can imagine it who has
seen a film in which a woman is attacked, beaten and raped in
a park, in her own apartment or anywhere else. The thing is: it
is exactly the same as any other rape. Someone grabs your hair,
slaps your face or hits it with a clenched fist, kicks you in the
stomach, or simply holds a knife to your throat . . . The differ-
ence between rape in films and marital rape is that we cannot
scream, as our child might wake up in the other room. Or that
our child is right there, next to us, her or his face distorted with
terror. And another difference is that the person who does this
to us is someone we used to love, someone we once trusted more
than anyone else. And there’s another difference, too: that others
say that we invented the whole thing. That we tell lies. Or if this
can really happen, it is not such a big deal.”25
A body of research now documents just how extensive the prob-
lem of spousal sexual assault actually is.26 In 2006, the United
Nations established the U.N. Task Force on Violence Against
Women, and the U.N. Secretary-General released an “in-depth
24. Randall, supra note 11.
25. Amnesty Int’l, Hungary: Cries Unheard: The Failure to Protect Women
from Rape and Sexual Violence in the Home, AI Index EUR 27/002/2007, at 4–
5 (May 10, 2007) [hereinafter Cries Unheard] (citing Krisztina Morvai, A csa-
ládon belüli erıszakos bőncselekmények kontextuális megközelítésének je-
lentısége a büntetı jogalkotásban és jogalkalmazásban [The Significance of a
Contextual Approach to Cases of Domestic Violence in Legislature and the Ap-
plication of Criminal Law] (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Eötvös Loránd
University of Budapest, 2001).
26. See Jill Duncan & Deborah Western, AUSTL. DOMESTIC&FAM. VIOLENCE
CLEARINGHOUSE, Addressing ‘The Ultimate Insult’: Responding to Women Ex-
periencing Intimate Partner Sexual Violence, Feb. 2011,
http://www.austdvclearinghouse.unsw.edu.au/documents/Stakeholder_Pa-
per_10.pdf; Lene Symes et al., Physical and Sexual Intimate Partner Violence,
Women’s Health and Children’s Behavioural Functioning: Entry Analysis of a
Seven-Year Prospective Study, 23 J. CLINICAL NURSING 2909 (2014).
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study on all forms of violence against women.”27 The study points
out that “[t]he most common form of violence experienced by
women globally is intimate partner violence” that includes “a
range of sexually, psychologically and physically coercive acts.”28
The World Health Organization (WHO) reports that available
data indicates that in some countries, nearly one in four women
may experience sexual violence by an intimate partner.29 The
most recent and extensive WHO report on the prevalence and
health effects of gendered violence indicates that 42 percent of
women who have been subjected to physical or sexual violence
at the hands of an intimate partner experienced injuries as a
result. Furthermore, women subjected to sexual violence by
their male intimates are 1.5 times more likely to acquire sex-
ually transmitted diseases such as syphilis infection, chlamydia,
or gonorrhoea. And in some regions women sexually violated by
male intimates are 1.5 times more likely to acquire HIV.30 Other
research suggests that approximately 40 percent of all assaulted
women are forced into sex at one time or another by their male
partners.31
Research in the United States revealed that 68 percent of
physically abused women also reported sexual assault perpe-
trated by their male intimate partners. Of those women, and
contrary to the mistaken belief that this problem is more pro-
nounced amongst racialized groups, 79 percent of sexually as-
saulted women reported repeated episodes of forced sex, with the
frequency of sexual assault highest for Caucasian women.32
27. U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL, ENDING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: FROM
WORDS TO ACTION, at ix, U.N. Sales No. E.06.IV.8 (2006) [hereinafter VAW
STUDY].
28. Id. at 43 (emphasis added).
29. WHO REPORT, supra note 9; see also Jacquelyn C. Campbell & Karen L.
Soeken, Forced Sex and Intimate Partner Violence: Effects on Women’s Risk
and Women’s Health, 5 VIOLENCEAGAINSTWOMEN 1017 (1999).
30. WHO et al., Global and Regional Estimates of Violence Against Women:
Prevalence and Health Effects of Intimate Partner Violence and Non-partner
Sexual Violence 31 (2013), http://www.who.int/reproductivehealth/publica-
tions/violence/9789241564625/en.
31. Jacquelyn C. Campbell & Peggy Alford, The Dark Consequences of Mar-
ital Rape, 89 AM. J. NURSING 946, 946 (1989).
32. Judith M. McFarlane & Ann Malecha, Sexual Assault among Intimates:
Frequency, Consequences & Treatments 3 (2005),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/211678.pdf.
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In the largest Canadian random survey conducted on the sub-
ject of violence against women, 39 percent of women interviewed
reported being sexually assaulted at some point in their lives
since the age of sixteen, 45 percent reported physical and sexual
violence by a marital or dating partner, and 25 percent of women
who were physically assaulted by a spouse were also sexually
assaulted.33 The large majority of sexual assaults (approxi-
mately three quarters of police reported sexual assaults) perpe-
trated against women in a 2008 Canadian survey were perpe-
trated by men known to them (only 24 percent of perpetrators
were strangers).34 The 2011 crime victimization survey by Sta-
tistics Canada reports that, in the five years prior to 2009, 6 per-
cent of women (six hundred thousand women) were victims of
marital violence and 460,000 women are sexually assaulted by
men other than marital partners each year.35
Furthermore, research has documented how many men openly
admit that they have forced their female partners to have sex.
In a recent study with a large sample size (N=1737) of men in
South Africa, Jewkes et al. report that 14.3 percent (241/1681)
of men disclosed that they had raped their wife, ex-wife, or girl-
friend.36 Findings from another large research study on rape per-
petration indicate that in Bangladesh 10 percent of urban men
and 15 percent of rural men reported that they had forced their
33. U.N., Econ. & Soc. Council, Economic Commission for Europe Confer-
ence of European Statisticians, Geneva, Switz., Sept. 11-16, 2006, Assessing
the Prevalence of Violence Against Women in Canada, paras. 22–24, U.N. Doc.
ECE/CES/GE.30/2006/8 (June 30, 2006). See also CAN. RES. INST. FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN, FACTSHEET: VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN CANADA
(2013), http://www.cwhn.ca/sites/de-
fault/files/CRIAW%20FACTSHEET%20Violence%20against%20women%20-
%20long%20version.pdf; HOLLY JOHNSON, DANGEROUS DOMAINS: VIOLENCE
AGAINSTWOMEN INCANADA (1996).
34. Roxan Vaillancourt, Gender Differences in Police-reported Violent Crime
in Canada, STATISTICS CANADA, May 2010, at 10,
http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85f0033m/85f0033m2010024-eng.pdf.
35. CAN. RES. INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN, supra note 33, at 2
(citing STATISTICS CANADA, FAMILY VIOLENCE IN CANADA: A STATISTICAL
PROFILE (2011), http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-224-x/85-224-x2010000-
eng.pdf).
36. Rachel Jewkes et al., Gender Inequitable Masculinity and Sexual Enti-
tlement in Rape Perpetration South Africa: Findings of a Cross-Sectional
Study, PLOS ONE, Dec. 2011, at 5, http://www.plosone.org/arti-
cle/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0029590.
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partners into sex.37 Similarly, in India, almost all sexual violence
occurred within marriage.38
Sexual assault of women in marriage and other marriage-like
intimate relationships is a form of domestic violence, which is a
problem the world over. As such, it requires social, educational,
and legal responses and remedies. These responses and reme-
dies must include the criminalization of sexual assault as a fun-
damental starting point, regardless of relational context. Legal
immunity for men who sexually violate their wives is patently
incompatible with criminalization of other sexual and physical
assaults.
II. MARITAL RAPE AS AN AFFRONT TOWOMEN’S FUNDAMENTAL
HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES
It is well recognized that violence against women represents a
breach of women’s fundamental human rights.39 As early as
1993, violence against women including marital rape was recog-
nized as representing a breach of women’s fundamental human
rights under international law in the U.N. Declaration on the
Elimination of Violence Against Women (DEVAW).40 The Fourth
World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995 and the result-
ing Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action reiterated that
violence against women under international law includes “phys-
ical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the family,
37. RUCHIRA TABASSUM NAVED ET AL., MEN’S ATTITUDES AND PRACTICES
REGARDING GENDER AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN BANGLADESH (2011),
http://www.partners4prevention.org/sites/default/files/documents/final_re-
port_0.pdf.
38. RACHEL JEWKES, SEXUAL VIOLENCE RESEARCH INITIATIVE, RAPE
PERPETRATION: A REVIEW 6 (2012) http://www.svri.org/RapePerpetration.pdf.
39. Human Rights Council Res. 23/25, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/23/25 (June
25, 2013).
40. U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A.
Res. 48/104, art. 1 (Dec. 20, 1993) [hereinafter DEVAW]. DEVAW provides the
first internationally agreed definition of violence against women: “‘Violence
against women’ means any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is
likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to
women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of lib-
erty, whether occurring in public or in private life.” Id. Article 2 specifies mar-
ital rape as being encompassed in the definition. Id. art. 2.
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including battering . . . , marital rape, . . . and violence related
to exploitation” and gender violence condoned by the state.41
The recognition that violence against women represents a
grave human rights violation has been developed and confirmed
over the past three decades. It is based not only on the fact that
gendered violence directly breaches several fundamental rights
requiring legal protection but also on the recognition that it in-
terferes with or entirely undermines the enjoyment of all other
rights. These rights include (and are not limited to) the rights to
life, freedom from torture, liberty and security of person, equal
protection under the law, equality within the family, health, and
just and favorable conditions of work.42 Marital rape, therefore,
by definition also constitutes a breach of all of these fundamen-
tal rights.
The following sections assess the ways in which human rights
norms in international law require that states take action to pre-
vent sexual violence against women in intimate relationships, a
project that necessarily includes the criminalization of rape and
sexual assault in marital and marital-type relationships. This
section begins with an overview of the due diligence standard as
it applies to violence against women and reviews the various in-
ternational and regional fora in which marital rape has been
identified as a critical human rights concern. The following sec-
tions elaborate on the ways in which international human rights
law demands criminalization of marital rape in order to respect,
fulfill, and protect women’s fundamental, and universal human
rights.
A. The Due Diligence Standard Requires the Criminalization of
Gendered Violence Under International Law
Where rights are legally guaranteed, the state must exercise
“due diligence” to ensure their fulfillment and protection. As
early as 1988, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ob-
served in Velásquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras that:
41. World Conference on Women, Rep. of the Fourth World Conference on
Women, para. 112, 113, 117, 118, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/20/Rev.1 (Sept. 15,
1996) (emphasis added).
42. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General
Recommendation 19 of the 11th Session, para. 7, U.N. Doc. A/47/38 (1992)
[hereinafter General Recommendation 19].
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[i]f the State apparatus acts in such a way that the violation
goes unpunished and the victim’s full enjoyment of such rights
is not restored as soon as possible, the State has failed to com-
ply with its duty to ensure the free and full exercise of those
rights the persons within its jurisdiction. The same is true
when the State allows private persons or groups to act freely
and with impunity to the detriment of the rights recognized by
the Convention.43
In this case the Court found that an illegal act “which violates
human rights and which is initially not directly imputable to a
State” can nevertheless create “international responsibility of
the state, not because of the act itself, but because of the lack of
due diligence to prevent the violation or to respond to it as re-
quired by the [American Convention on Human Rights].”44 The
due diligence standard is perhaps the most important resource
in international law for marshaling state power through law to
combat violence against women and provide effective remedies
for it. Under international law, the due diligence standard es-
tablishes that a state is obliged to prevent, investigate, punish,
and provide remedies for violations of human rights, regardless
of whether the acts are committed by state or non-state actors.45
In 1993, the due diligence standard was extended to apply to
gender violence. The 1993 DEVAW adopted by the General As-
sembly specifies that all U.N.-member states have a duty to
“pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of
eliminating violence against women.”46 This includes “due dili-
gence to prevent, investigate and, in accordance with national
legislation, punish acts of violence against women, whether those
acts are perpetuated by the State or by private persons.”47
DEVAW affirms that violence against women constitutes a “vio-
lation of the rights and fundamental freedoms of women and im-
pairs or nullifies their enjoyment of those rights and freedoms.”48
While DEVAW does not impose binding obligations on states,
the norms set forth in the Declaration have high persuasive
43. Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Compensation, Judgment, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, ¶ 176 (July 29, 1988).
44. Id. ¶¶ 172–176 (emphasis added).
45. Id. ¶ 166.
46. DEVAW, supra note 40, art.4 (Dec. 20, 1993).
47. Id. art. 4(c) (emphasis added).
48. Id. pmbl.
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value because the Declaration shows consensus that gender vio-
lence is a fundamental human rights violation that states must
take specific measures to combat. Furthermore, given that
DEVAW identifies violence against women as a violation of fun-
damental freedoms, a state’s obligations to punish acts of gender
violence derive from the state’s obligation to prevent violations
of these fundamental freedoms.
The due diligence standard was reiterated in the Beijing Dec-
laration and Platform for Action, which was adopted by 189 U.N.
member states.49 The Beijing Declaration further recognized
that violence against women, including marital rape, “is a man-
ifestation of the historically unequal power relations between
men and women” and demanded that states enact or reinforce
sanctions that punish perpetrators and provide women with ac-
cess to justice.50
In 1994, the U.N. Economic and Social Council adopted Reso-
lution 1994/45 of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights and
established the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Violence
against Women to recommend measures to eliminate violence
against women and its causes, and to remedy its consequences.51
The Resolution emphasized that it is,
the duty of Governments to refrain from engaging in violence
against women and to exercise due diligence to prevent, inves-
tigate and, in accordance with national legislation, to punish
acts of violence against women and to take appropriate and ef-
fective action concerning acts of violence against women,
whether those acts are perpetrated by the State or by private
persons, and to provide access to just and effective remedies and
specialized assistance to victims.52
In a key report on the due diligence standard, the Special Rap-
porteur on Violence against Women outlined the way in which
the due diligence standard obligates states to prevent, investi-
gate, punish, and provide remedies for acts of violence against
women, precisely because these acts are grave human rights vi-
olations.53
49. World Conference on Women, supra note 41, para. 124(b).
50. Id. para. 118, 124(c) & (h).
51. Commission on Human Rights Res. 1995/86, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1995/176, at 253 (Mar. 8, 1995).
52. Id. para. 2 (emphasis added).
53. See generally Yakin Ertürk (Special Rapporteur on Violence Against
Women, Its Causes and Consequences), U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm’n on
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Throughout the first decade of the twenty-first century, a num-
ber of important human rights cases were litigated by women
whose governments had failed to protect them from egregious
violence perpetrated by male intimates. These important deci-
sions of the European Court of Human Rights in Bevacqua and
S. v. Bulgaria and Opuz v. Turkey, the CEDAW Committee in
AT v. Hungary, and the decisions of the Inter-American Com-
mission on Human Rights (IACHR) inMaria da Penha s v. Bra-
zil and Lenahan (Gonzales) v. United States began to give shape
to and articulate the content of a state’s duties to combat domes-
tic violence.54 While some commentators have argued that the
due diligence standard with respect to domestic violence is still
being shaped and is only emerging as customary international
law through “a growing consensus,”55 a more persuasive view is
that the due diligence standard has now become an accepted
norm.
The fact that the due diligence standard is now the accepted
norm is evident from recent cases and legislation in regional and
domestic fora that take for granted a due diligence responsibility
on the part of the state to effectively combat domestic violence.
As the IACHR recently observed in Lenahan v. United States:
There is a broad international consensus over the use of the
due diligence principle to interpret the content of State legal
obligations towards the problem of violence against women; a
consensus that extends to the problem of domestic violence.
Human Rights, Rep. on Violence Against Women, The Due Diligence Standard
as a Tool for the Elimination of Violence Against Women, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2006/61 (Jan. 20, 2006).
54. Bevacqua and S. V. Bulgaria, App. No. 71127/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008),
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/research/bulgaria/BEVACQUA.pdf; Opuz v.
Turkey, App. No. 33401/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009),
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardset-
ting/minjust/mju29/CASE%20OF%20OPUZ%20v%5B1%5D.%20TURKEY.pdf
; Maria Da Penha v. Brazil, Case 12.051, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No.
54/01, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.111, doc. 20 rev. at 704 (2001); Lenahan v. United
States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 80/11,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.142, doc. 11 ¶¶ 170, 177, 199 (2011); Comm. on the Elimina-
tion of Discrimination Against Women, Comm. No. 2/2003, Ms. A. T. v. Hun-
gary, ¶¶ 9.3–.4, CEDAW/C/36/D/2/2003 (Jan. 26, 2005).
55. Lee Hasselbacher, State Obligations Regarding Domestic Violence: The
European Court of Human Rights, Due Diligence, And International Legal
Minimums of Protection, 8 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 190, 198 (2010) (emphasis
added).
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This consensus is a reflection of the international community’s
growing recognition of violence against women as a human
rights problem requiring State action.56
States that are parties to the CEDAW Convention are obligated
to adopt the principles of the CEDAW Committee’s General Rec-
ommendation 19 on Violence against Women. They thereby have
directly undertaken obligations of “due diligence” to combat vio-
lence against women.57
The obligation of due diligence under the CEDAW Convention,
therefore, requires that states prevent violations of the rights of
women, obligates them to investigate and punish acts of vio-
lence, and obligates them to provide compensation for gendered
violence.58 Importantly, for this analysis of marital rape, the
standard requires that state parties implement “effective legal
measures, including penal sanctions, civil remedies and compen-
satory provisions to protect women against all kinds of violence,
including, inter alia, violence and abuse in the family, sexual as-
sault . . . .”59 Thus, the due diligence standard has both protective
and proactive elements. That is, it obligates states both to re-
spond appropriately to crimes of violence against women already
committed and to take positive steps to stop the perpetration of
these crimes.
General Recommendation 19 also calls on state parties to
make sure that the laws “give adequate protection to all
women.”60 What constitutes “adequate protection,” however, is
not defined. Nor is the Recommendation clear about whether
criminal sanctions, and specifically, criminalization of marital
rape, is a necessary component of adequate protection. With re-
spect to domestic violence, the Recommendation only calls for
“criminal penalties where necessary,” so long as the state parties
are taking efforts to make sure that women are receiving “effec-
tive protection” from the state against gender-based violence.61
Criminalizing marital rape, however, must be a fundamental re-
quirement of the state’s due diligence obligation to remedy and
prevent this form of gendered violence.
56. Lenahan v. United States, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.142, doc. 11 ¶ 123.
57. General Recommendation 19, supra note 42, art. 9.
58. Id. art. 24(r)–(t).
59. Id. art. 24(r)(i), (t)(i) (emphasis added).
60. Id. art. 24(b).
61. Id. art. 24(r)(i).
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Even from the instrumentalist perspective that is imposed by
General Recommendation 19, penal sanctions are necessary for
“adequate protection” from gendered violence. When Amnesty
International researchers asked women in Afghanistan about
solutions to the problem of domestic violence, the women recog-
nized the necessity of making these acts illegal and subject to
punishment, both to signal the social wrong and to deter this
kind of gendered violence.62 Through criminalization, one
woman said, “[m]en would learn it is wrong and would stop beat-
ing us.”63 Criminalization both codifies rights and creates a po-
tential source of power for victims to get access to legal remedies
when those rights are violated. In this way, the law’s power is
both symbolic and practical. Criminalization of sexual assault in
marriage can and should operate on both levels.
Lastly, in criminalizing marital rape, the due diligence stand-
ard also requires that pursuing civil remedies through domestic
violence legislation does not exclude or preclude the need for
criminal remedies. With regard to the domestic violence legisla-
tion in Peru, for example, although the rape laws in the criminal
legislation do not exclude marital rape, the Law for Protection
from Family Violence (“Family Violence Law”) excludes marital
rape.64 As a result, victims in Peru are forced to choose between
two options. They can either file a psychological abuse complaint
under the Family Violence Law or they can file a standard crim-
inal rape complaint, which does not provide access to the imme-
diate protection order and other benefits available in the Family
Violence law.65 Thus merely removing the marital-rape exemp-
tion from the criminal code on rape, without taking into account
other barriers to obtaining effective criminal sanctions, will not
satisfy the due diligence standard to protect women from domes-
tic sexual violence.
62. Amnesty Int’l, Afghanistan: “No-One Listens to Us and No-One Treats
Us as Human Beings,” Justice Denied to Women, AI Index ASA 11/023/2003
(Oct. 5, 2003).
63. Id. at 12.
64. Peru: Law of Protection from Family Violence, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Mar.
31, 2000), http://www.hrw.org/news/2000/03/31/peru-law-protection-family-vi-
olence [hereinafter Law of Protection]; see alsoMichelle A. McKinley, Emanci-
patory Politics and Rebellious Practices: Incorporation Global Human Rights
in Family Violence Laws in Peru, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 75, 121 n.190
(2006).
65. Law of Protection, supra note 64.
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B. The International Instruments and Agreements Requiring
the Criminalization of Marital Rape
There are multiple reports, conventions, resolutions, and di-
rectives requiring that states criminalize marital rape. The U.N.
Secretary General’s 2006 report, Ending violence against
women: From words to action, reiterates the Beijing Platform’s
exhortation “to treat all forms of violence against women and
girls as criminal offences.”66
Violence against women, including spousal rape, has similarly
been given high priority for immediate legislative action by re-
gional human rights systems. On June 9, 1994, the Organization
of American States (OAS) adopted the Inter-American Conven-
tion to Prevent, Punish and Eradicate Violence against Women
(also called Convention of Belém do Parà).67 The Convention rec-
ognizes all gender-based violence as an abuse of human rights
and has been ratified by thirty-two states.68 In this Convention,
violence against women is defined as including “physical, sexual
and psychological violence,” which occurs “within the family or
domestic unit or within any other interpersonal relationship,
whether or not the perpetrator shares or has shared the same
residence with the woman.”69 This Convention additionally pro-
vides an individual right of petition and a right for nongovern-
mental organizations (NGOs) to lodge complaints with the
IACHR.70
66. VAWSTUDY, supra note 27, at 12 (emphasis added). The U.N. Secretary
General also noted,
State inaction with regard to the proper functioning of the criminal
justice system has particularly corrosive effects as impunity for acts of
violence against women encourages further violence and reinforces
women’s subordination. Such inaction by the State to address the
causes of violence against women constitutes lack of compliance with
human rights obligations.
Id. at 37 (emphasis added).
67. Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradi-
cation of Violence Against Women, June, 9 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1534 [hereinafter
Convention of Belém do Pará].
68. Id. pmbl.; see also List of Countries that Signed, Ratified and Acceded to
the Convention of Belém do Pará, ORG. AM. STATES, http://www.oas.org/jurid-
ico/english/sigs/a-61.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2015).
69. Convention of Belém do Pará, supra note 67, art. 2
70. Id. art. 12.
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The IACHR has consistently demanded that states adopt
“criminal, civil and administrative laws to prevent, punish and
eradicate violence against women” and, importantly, to make no
distinctions based on marital status of victim or perpetrator.71 A
recent report also points out that historically while “honor” and
other patriarchal cultural values used to be the core interests at
stake in sexual violence crimes, it is no longer condoned in many
states.72 Criminal laws in the Meso-American countries, for ex-
ample, now take other legal rights and interests into account
such as personal security/integrity (Nicaragua) and sexual self-
determination (El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras) provid-
ing further evidence that criminalizing marital rape is increas-
ingly an accepted international norm.73 The IACHR report also
asserts that under all circumstances rape is a crime against so-
ciety and has to be prosecuted by the state as a crime even when
the victim “forgives” the perpetrator.74
Nevertheless, the marital-rape exemption has still not been
eliminated in many OAS states. It is ironic that many of the
postcolonial countries in the Caribbean (and elsewhere such as
South Asia) resort to the British common law marital-rape ex-
emption articulated by Lord Hale when the U.K. House of Lords
has since then explicitly ruled on the exemption’s inapplicability
in “modern times.”75 The Caribbean Committee (“CARICOM”)
model legislation for sexual offences insufficiently demands a
criminalization of marital rape only under specific conditions of
71. INTER-AM. COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR WOMEN
VICTIMS OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE INMESOAMERICA, at xi, para. 4 (2011) (emphasis
added) [hereinafter Inter-Am. Comm’n on Human Rights, Mesoamerica Re-
port].
72. Id. at 15 para. 48.
73. Id.
74. See id. at 35–40.
75. R v R, [1992] 1 AC 599 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.). The court stated:
[M]arriage is in modern times regarded as a partnership of equals and
no longer one in which the wife must be the subservient chattel of the
husband. Hale’s proposition involves that by marriage a wife gives her
irrevocable consent to sexual intercourse with her husband under all
circumstances and irrespective of the state of her health or how she
happens to be feeling at the time. In modern times any reasonable
person must regard that conception as quite unacceptable.
Id. at 616 (emphasis added).
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divorce, separation, or direct order.76 Countries like Trinidad
and Tobago and Guyana have nonetheless removed the marital
rape exemption from their laws.77
The recent Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and
Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (“Is-
tanbul Convention” or “CAHVIO”), in effect as of August 2014,
is one of the most comprehensive instruments against gender vi-
olence. The Istanbul Convention explicitly obligates its Parties
to criminalize sexual violence, inter alia, when committed
against former or current spouses or partners, whether living or
not living in the same residence.78 The Council of Europe in-
cludes forty-seven countries extending all the way to the Rus-
sian Federation.79
76. 8 CARICOMMODEL LEGISLATION ON SEXUALOFFENCES ¶ 4(4) (1997).
77. Sexual Offences Act, ACT 27 OF 1986, Chapter 11:28 (2000) (as amended
by Act 20 of 1994 and Act 31 of 2000) (Trin. and Tobago), http://rgd.legalaf-
fairs.gov.tt/Laws2/Alphabetical_List/lawspdfs/11.28.pdf; Sexual Offences Act,
ACT NO. 7 OF 2010, Official Gazette [Legal Supp.] 33 (2010) (Guy.)
http://scm.oas.org/pdfs/2010/CIM02920T-2.pdf.
78. Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and
Domestic Violence, art. 36, May 11, 2011, C.E.T.S. No. 201 [hereinafter Istan-
bul Convention (CAHVIO)]. Article 36 of the Convention, on “[s]exual violence,
including rape,” states:
1. Parties shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to
ensure that the following intentional conducts are criminalised:
a) engaging in non-consensual vaginal, anal or oral penetration of a
sexual nature of the body of another person with any bodily part or
object;
b) engaging in other non-consensual acts of a sexual nature with a
person;
c) causing another person to engage in non-consensual acts of a sexual
nature with a third person.
2. Consent must be given voluntarily as the result of the person’s free
will assessed in the context of the surrounding circumstances.
3. Parties shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to
ensure that the provisions of paragraph 1 also apply to acts committed
against former or current spouses or partners as recognised by internal
law.
Id. (emphasis added).
79. Our Member States, COUNCIL OF EUR., http://www.coe.int/en/web/about-
us/our-member-states (last visited Oct. 25, 2015).
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The EU expressly called for the criminalization of marital rape
in the European Parliament’s Resolution on Violence Against
Women of 1986.80 In 2009, the European Parliament’s Resolution
on the Elimination of Violence Against Women pointed out that
“men’s violence against women represents a violation of human
rights, and in particular: the right to life, the right to safety, the
right to dignity, the right to physical and mental integrity, and
the right to sexual and reproductive choice and health.”81 The
Resolution further noted that gendered violence “is an obstacle
to the participation of women in social activities, in political and
public life and in the labor market, and can lead to marginaliza-
tion and poverty for women.”82 The Parliament urged that Mem-
ber States must
recognize sexual violence and rape against women, including
within marriage and intimate informal relationships and/or
where committed by male relatives, as a crime in cases where
the victim did not give consent, and to ensure that such of-
fences result in automatic prosecution and reject any reference
to cultural, traditional or religious practices or traditions as a
mitigating factor in cases of violence against women.83
Resolutions by the European Parliament, unlike the Istanbul
Convention, are not legally binding. But the Parliament’s call for
the criminalization of sexual violence in the domestic sphere
(amongst other types of gender violence) in several resolutions
80. Resolution on Violence Against Women, EUR. PARL. DOC. A2-44/86
(1986) [hereinafter 1986 Resolution]. The European Parliament in Article 10,
“calls for the legal recognition, in those countries where such is not yet the
case, of rape within the marriage, and further calls for the same treatment by
the law of forced sexual acts, within and without marriage,” id. art. 10, while
Article 11, calls for
sexual violence, whether individual or group violence, to be considered
a crime for which proceedings may be brought in all cases, not only by
the injured party, but also by the public authorities: and further calls
for women’s associations and movements to be allowed to bring civil
actions for damages in proceedings for sexual violence, if the injured
party so requests.
Id. art. 11.
81. See Resolution on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, EUR.
PARL. DOC. P7_TA(2009)0098, pmbl. para. E (2009) [hereinafter 2009
Resolution].
82. Id. pmbl. para. F.
83. Id. para. 24 (emphasis added).
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(as well as by several EU actors) illustrates the widespread
recognition of the fundamental rights implicated by state fail-
ures to criminalize sexual violence in the private sphere.84 In ad-
dition, the EU has enacted Directive 2012/29/EU establishing
minimum standards and safeguards that must be enforced to
protect direct victims of crime and which automatically assumes
that intimate partner sexual violence is criminalized in EU-
member states.85
Unlike resolutions of the European Parliament, directives are
legal acts of the EU imposing obligations on member states to
achieve a specific result through the implementation of domestic
legislative procedures.86 Directive 2012/29/EU, calling for effec-
tive imposition of criminal sanctions in cases of intimate partner
sexual violence, inter alia, has to be implemented by member
states within two years of its enactment, and requires that
within three years Member states must show the Commission
data showing how victims have accessed the rights set out in the
directive.87 The directive explicitly defines gender violence as in-
cluding intimate partner sexual violence and emphasizes the
harmful consequences of gender violence and spousal sexual vi-
olence on the rights and well-being of the victim. It specifies that
Violence that is directed against a person because of that per-
son’s gender, gender identity or gender expression or that af-
fects persons of a particular gender disproportionately, is un-
derstood as gender-based violence. It may result in physical,
sexual, emotional or psychological harm, or economic loss, to
the victim. Gender-based violence is understood to be a form of
84. Resolution with Recommendations to the Commission on Combating
Violence Against Women, Preamble, EUR. PARL. DOC. P7_TA-
PROV(2014)0126, pmbl. (2014) (listing European Parliamentary resolutions
and actions addressing violence against women, including intimate partner
sexual violence).
85. Council Directive 2012/29, 2012 O.J. (L 315) 57.
86. EUROPEAN UNION LAW AFTER MAASTRICHT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR
LAWYERS OUTSIDE THE COMMON MARKET 5 (Ralph Haughwout Folsom, Ralph
B. Lake & Ved P. Nanda eds., 1996).
87. Directorate General Justice, European Commission, Guidance Docu-
ment related to the Transposition and Implementation of Directive
2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012
establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of vic-
tims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA, at
3 and at 50, Doc. ARES(2013)3763804 (Dec. 2013), http://ec.europa.eu/jus-
tice/criminal/files/victims/guidance_victims_rights_directive_en.pdf.
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discrimination and a violation of the fundamental freedoms of
the victim and includes violence in close relationships, sexual
violence (including rape, sexual assault and harassment) . . .
Women victims of gender-based violence and their children of-
ten require special support and protection because of the high
risk of secondary and repeat victimization, of intimidation and
of retaliation connected with such violence.88
The directive furthermore explicitly recognizes the particular
dynamics of violence in intimate relationships and the need for
states to adopt special protection measures. It states that:
Where violence is committed in a close relationship, it is com-
mitted by a person who is a current or former spouse, or partner
or other family member of the victim, whether or not the of-
fender shares or has shared the same household with the victim.
Such violence could cover physical, sexual, psychological, or
economic violence and could result in physical, mental or emo-
tional harm or economic loss. Violence in close relationships is
a serious and often hidden social problem, which could cause
systematic psychological and physical trauma with severe con-
sequences because the offender is a person whom the victim
should be able to trust. Victims of violence in close relationships
may therefore be in need of special protection measures.
Women are affected disproportionately by this type of violence
and the situation can be worse if the woman is dependent on
the offender economically, socially or as regards her right to
residence.89
In 2003, the African Union adopted the Protocol on the Rights of
Women in Africa to the African Charter on Human Rights that
defines violence against women as including “all acts perpe-
trated against women which cause or could cause them physical,
sexual, psychological, and economic harm, including the threat
to take such acts . . . in private or public life.”90 Asia does not
have an effective regional human rights system, however several
88. Council Directive 2012/29, supra note 85, para. 17 (emphasis added).
89. Id. para. 18 (emphasis added).
90. Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the
Rights of Women in Africa, art. 1(j), July 11, 2003 [hereinafter Maputo Proto-
col] (emphasis added).
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countries have tabled bills, some successfully, that call for crim-
inalization of marital rape in their legislatures.91 Progress on the
criminalization of marital rape in jurisdictions around the world,
therefore, has been steady, but also slow and uneven.
III. INTERNATIONALHUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND THE RIGHTS
VIOLATED BYMARITAL RAPE
The key and specific fundamental rights violated by the crime
of spousal rape are identified in the following sections. Marital
rape violates jus cogens norms such as the prohibition against
torture, as well as fundamental human rights such as the right
to life, liberty, and security of person, equal protection under the
law, and nondiscrimination. It further violates rights critical to
the autonomy and well-being of an individual such as the right
to health and to equality within the family.92 Moreover, marital
rape impinges on the myriad other rights that have been recog-
nized by regional human rights instruments, domestic laws, and
transitional and domestic courts. These include the rights to sex-
ual self-determination, human dignity, humane treatment, pri-
91. At least eleven Asian countries explicitly criminalize marital rape, in-
cluding Nepal, Thailand, Indonesia, and China. Tay Suan Chian & Shuli Sud-
deruddin, Singapore: Proposed Marital Rape Law Welcomed, IF ONLY
SINGAPOREANS STOPPED TO THINK BLOG (Feb. 19, 2012), http://ifonlysingapore-
ans.blogspot.com/2012/02/proposed-marital-rape-law-welcomed.html; Vishal
Arora, Maldives President Vetoes Marital Rape Bill as “un-Islamic,” WASH.
POST (Jan. 16, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/religion/mal-
dives-president-vetoes-marital-rape-bill-as-un-islamic/2014/01/16/d8f50b8a-
7ed3-11e3-97d3-b9925ce2c57b_story.html; Yuen Melkeng, Malaysia Urged to
Make Marital Rape a Crime, ASIA NEWS NETWORK (Feb. 6, 2013),
http://www.asianewsnet.net/Malaysia-urged-to-make-marital-rape-a-crime-
42395.html; Thailand Outlaws Marital Rape, CHINA POST (June 22, 2007),
http://www.chinapost.com.tw/2007/06/22/113083/Thailand-outlaws.htm; Mar-
ital Rape: Parliamentary Panel and Government Decide Against Terming It a
Criminal Offence, ECON. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2013), http://articles.economictimes.in-
diatimes.com/2013-03-02/news/37390035_1_criminal-offence-parliamentary-
panel-panel-chairman; Malaysian Man Convicted of Marital Rape Under New
Law, JAKARTA GLOBE (Aug. 6, 2009), http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/ar-
chive/malaysian-man-convicted-of-marital-rape-under-new-law/; Marital
Rape Outlawed by Nepal’s Supreme Court, PANOS LONDON (Oct. 1, 2002),
http://panos.org.uk/features/marital-rape-outlawed-by-nepals-supreme-court/.
92. General Recommendation 19, supra note 42, art. 7.
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vacy, effective judicial recourse, safety, physical and mental in-
tegrity, integrity of the person, sexual and reproductive choice,
and health.93
The U.N. has consistently declared that violence against
women impairs or nullifies women’s human rights and their ex-
ercise of “fundamental freedoms” whether this violence occurs in
public or in private life.94 The CEDAW Committee has specifi-
cally identified these rights as being impaired or entirely nulli-
fied by gender violence.95 These rights are protected in the core
human rights treaties that have been ratified by most countries.
The core international treaties protecting human rights include
the ICCPR, ICESCR, the Convention Against Torture (or “Tor-
ture Convention”), and the CEDAW.96Human rights treaties im-
pose obligations on the state to regulate the actions of private
93. American Convention on Human Rights, arts. 1, 2, 5, 11 & 25, Nov. 22,
1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; Convention of Belém do Pará, supra note 67, art. 7;
Maputo Protocol, supra note 90, arts. 3, 4; 2009 Resolution, supra note 81;
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, arts. 1, 3, 4, 6, 20, 21
& 23, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1 (Dec. 18, 2000); see also Maria Da Penha v. Brazil,
Case 12.051, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 54/01, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.111,
doc. 20 rev. at 704 (2001).
94. DEVAW, supra note 40, pmbl., arts. 1, 4(c) (emphasis added).
95. In its General Recommendation 19, the Committee on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women identified gender-based vio-
lence, including rape and sexual violence within the family, as a form of dis-
crimination, stating that:
Gender-based violence, which impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by
women of human rights and fundamental freedoms under general in-
ternational law or under human rights conventions, is discrimination
within the meaning of article 1 of the Convention. These rights and
freedoms include: (a) The right to life; (b) The right not to be subject
to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;
(c) The right to equal protection according to humanitarian norms in
time of international or internal armed conflict; (d) The right to liberty
and security of person; (e) The right to equal protection under the law;
(f) The right to equality in the family; (g) The right to the highest
standard attainable of physical and mental health; (h) The right to
just and favourable conditions of work.
General Recommendation 19, supra note 42, art.7.
96. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S.
3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR]; Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Convention
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actors. As with all other specific human rights violations, mari-
tal rape is not explicitly mentioned in the instruments. As shown
in the earlier section, treaty bodies like the CEDAW Committee
have interpreted these rights to include the prohibition of mari-
tal rape. By ratifying these conventions, states accept the juris-
diction of the treaty bodies to monitor state compliance and to
provide the substantive content for the rights and the nature of
obligations through general comments and recommendations.
The analysis turns next to the specific and most fundamental
human rights which are breached by marital rape.
A. The Right Not to be Subject to Torture or to Cruel, Inhuman,
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
The right to be free from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment includes the right to be free from domestic vio-
lence and rape.97 The Committee against Torture has empha-
sized that gender violence or rape by non-state actors constitutes
a violation of the Torture Convention.98Marital rape satisfies all
the elements of an act of torture as defined in Article 1 of the
Convention Against Torture since it is an act of (1) infliction of
severe pain and suffering; (2) for a prohibited purpose that in-
cludes coercion, intimidation, or discrimination, and (3) is acqui-
esced to or condoned by a state actor.99 Although the Convention
Against Torture does not require both physical and mental suf-
fering for an act to qualify as an act of torture, marital rape is
“intentionally inflicted” and is an act which can impose “severe
pain and suffering,” both physical and mental.100
Against Torture]; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter
CEDAW].
97. See generally Barbara C. Alexander, Convention Against Torture: A Vi-
able Alternative Legal Remedy for Domestic Violence Victims, 15 AM. U. INT’L
L. REV. 895 (1999); Rhonda Copelon, Gender Violence as Torture: The Contri-
bution of Cat General Comment No. 2, 11 N.Y.C. L. REV. 229 (2007); Katharine
Fortin, Rape as Torture: An Evaluation of the Committee Against Torture’s At-
titude to Sexual Violence, 4 UTRECHT L. REV. 145 (2008).
98. Comm. Against Torture, General Comment No. 2 to the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment on the Implementation of Article 2 by States Parties, U.N. Doc.
CAT/C/GC/2/CRP.1/Rev.4, paras. 18, 22 (Nov. 23, 2007) [hereinafter CAT
General Comment 2].
99. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 96, art. 1.
100. Id.
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In international criminal law, rape has also been identified as
constituting torture and cruel and inhuman treatment, even
when conducted by private actors, if it is condoned or tolerated
by the state.101 International criminal law is concerned with in-
dividual responsibility, whereas international human rights law
is concerned with state responsibility, and the two define rape
and torture somewhat differently.102 Yet the absolute condemna-
tion of rape as an act of torture in both fields, along with the
requirement that rape perpetrated by private actors must be
criminalized, demonstrates the universality and convergence in
international law in matters of sexual violence against
women.103
The due diligence standard is not met if the state fails to stop,
sanction, and provide remedies to victims of gender violence, or
if the state “facilitates and enables non-State actors to commit
acts impermissible under the Convention with impunity.”104
The General Comment further states that the state bears re-
sponsibility and its officials should be considered as authors, for
consenting to or acquiescing in such impermissible acts.105 The
state’s indifference or inaction on these crimes are deemed to
101. CAT General Comment 2, supra note 98, ¶18. See Prosecutor v.
Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶¶144, 153–89 (ICTY, Dec. 10,
1998); Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶
597 (ICTR, Sept. 2, 1998) (“Like torture, rape is used for such purposes as
intimidation, degradation, humiliation, discrimination, punishment, control or
destruction of a person.”).
102. REDRESS, REDRESS FOR RAPE: USING INTERNATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE ON
RAPE AS A FORM OF TORTURE OR OTHER ILL TREATMENT (2013),
http://www.redress.org/downloads/publications/FINAL%20Rape%20as%20To
rture%20(1).pdf.
103. For example, the International Criminal Tribunal of Yugoslavia has
confirmed that the prohibition against torture in both times of peace and
during an armed conflict by a public or private actor (where consent or
acquiescence is implied if no actions are taken to protect) constitutes a norm of
jus cogens, which is therefore nonderogable and that rape is a form of torture.
In Prosecutor v. Furundžija, the Tribunal extensively analyzed the criminal
sanction against rape, asserting that rape is an outrage upon personal dignity
and physical integrity, which is a fundamental right and a part of customary
international law; furthermore, the tribunal stated “the principle of respect for
human dignity is the basic underpinning and indeed the very raison d’être of
international humanitarian law and human rights law general.” Case No. IT-
95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 144, 183,163–89.
104. CAT General Comment No. 2, supra note 98, para. 18.
105. Id.
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“provide a form of encouragement and/or de-facto permission.”106
State failures to criminalize marital rape, therefore, represent
such an encouragement or de facto permission for this crime.
The Committee Against Torture has identified women as a so-
cial group specifically at risk of torture by private actors in their
homes. In the Committee’s own words, “[t]he contexts in which
[women] are at risk include deprivation of liberty, medical treat-
ment, particularly involving reproductive decisions, and violence
by private actors in communities and homes.”107 As women con-
stitute a social group at risk for violence in intimate relation-
ships, the Torture Convention particularly obliges the state Par-
ties to ensure the protection of women facing risk of domestic
violence and/or rape “by fully prosecuting and punishing all acts
of violence and abuse against these individuals and ensuring im-
plementation of other positive measures of prevention and pro-
tection.”108
The Committee Against Torture is categorical about the range
of measures that states are obliged to implement. These
measures include “making the offence of torture punishable as
an offence under its criminal law,” in accordance, at a minimum,
with the elements of torture as defined in Article 1 of the Con-
vention Against Torture, and the requirements of Article 4.109 It
includes making sure that there are no loopholes in the law that
can result in perpetrators escaping criminal sanctions.110 As
such, since marital rape is an act of torture, the Convention
mandates that the state must enact criminal sanctions.
In particular, the Committee Against Torture emphasizes, “el-
ements of intent and purpose . . . do not involve a subjective in-
quiry into the motivations of the perpetrators, but rather must be
objective determinations under the circumstances.”111 This im-
portant insight is of direct relevance to overcoming well-docu-
mented evidentiary barriers in prosecuting marital rape. Fur-
thermore, it is a violation of the Convention to prosecute conduct
solely as “ill-treatment” where the elements of torture are also
106. Id.
107. Id. para. 22.
108. Id. para. 21.
109. Id. para. 8 (emphasis added).
110. Id. para. 9.
111. Id. (emphasis added).
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present.112 Thus, it is a violation of international law against tor-
ture if the state minimizes sanctions against marital rape by in-
corporating them indirectly in legislation and civil remedies
aimed at “ill-treatment” or abuse by intimate partners.
The prohibition against torture is absolute and non-derogable;
it is a jus cogens norm that states are obligated to respect re-
gardless of their treaty obligations. Due diligence under this
norm requires a mandatory criminalization of any act qualifying
as torture, in this case, marital rape.
The Committee Against Torture also explains why criminali-
zation is a just and necessary remedy:
Naming and defining [torture as a distinct crime] will promote
the Convention’s aim, inter alia, by alerting everyone, includ-
ing perpetrators, victims, and the public, to the special gravity
of the crime of torture. Codifying this crime will also emphasize
the need for a) appropriate punishment that takes into account
the gravity of the offence, b) strengthening the deterrent effect
of the prohibition itself and c) enhancing the ability of respon-
sible officials to track the specific crime of torture and d) ena-
bling and empowering the public to monitor and, when re-
quired, to challenge state action as well as state inaction that
violates the Convention.113
The Committee Against Torture also states that criminalization
alone is not sufficient as a remedy, especially when dealing with
at-risk groups such as women. Additional obligatory measures
include sensitization trainings, education, monitoring inter alia,
which are required for preventing such acts.114 Nevertheless,
criminalization is the first and essential step in the condemna-
tion of the act and protection of the victim.115
That marital rape can qualify as an act of torture or cruel, de-
grading, and inhuman treatment is further evident from the def-
inition derived by other human rights bodies and courts.116 The
112. Id. para. 10.
113. Id. para. 11.
114. Id. paras. 24, 25.
115. Id. paras. 8–10.
116. See, e.g., Aydin v. Turkey (No. 50), 1996–VII 75 Eur.Ct.H.R. 1866 at ¶86
(1997) (noting that the “especially cruel act of rape . . . amounted to torture”);
Opuz v. Turkey, Eur.Ct.H.R. App. No. 33401/02 (2009) (ruling that state
failure to protect against physical and psychological violence in domestic
relationships amounted to a violation of Article 3 of the European Convention
of Human Rights).
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European Court of Human Rights as well as other highest na-
tional courts have found that premeditated punishment or be-
havior causing intense physical and mental suffering is equiva-
lent to inhuman treatment.117Degrading treatment has been de-
scribed as arousing in its victims feelings of fear, anguish, and
inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them and possi-
bly breaking their physical and moral resistance. By this defini-
tion, marital rape is clearly a form of inhuman, degrading treat-
ment.
The prohibition of torture relates not only to acts that cause
physical pain but also to acts that cause mental suffering to the
victim. Psychological trauma from marital rape can lead to anx-
iety, shock, intense fear, depression, suicidal ideation, and long-
lasting post-traumatic stress.118 In Meija v. Peru, the IACHR
recognized that:
Rape causes physical and mental suffering in the victim. In ad-
dition to the violence suffered at the time it is committed, the
victims are commonly hurt or, in some cases, are even made
pregnant. The fact of being made the subject of abuse of this
nature also causes a psychological trauma that results, on the
one hand, from having been humiliated and victimized, and on
the other, from suffering the condemnation of the members of
their community if they report what has been done to them.119
This aspect of marital rape as an act of extraordinary humilia-
tion and victimization suggests that marital rape can be catego-
rized as an act of torture, even in cases where there is no non-
sexual or other physical violence inflicted by the perpetrator.
The content of the due diligence standard requires that states
address violations of this fundamental jus cogens norm; this
must include the criminalization of marital rape.
117. See, e.g., Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 439,
478 (1989); United States v. Burns, [2001] S.C.R. 283 (Can.).
118. Saurabh Mishra & Sarvesh Singh, Marital Rape—Myth, Reality, and
Need for Criminalization, PRAC. LAW. WEB J., no. 12, 2003, http://www.ebc-in-
dia.com/lawyer/articles/645.htm; Rachel Kennedy Bergen,Marital Rape: New
Research and Directions VAWNET APPLIED RES. F., Feb. 2006, at 5,
https://www.nycourts.gov/ip/women-
inthecourts/pdfs/MARITAL%20RAPE_1_d_1.pdf.
119. Raquel Martí De Mejía v. Perú, Case 10.970, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R.,
Report No. 5/96, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.91, doc. 7 at 157 (1996).
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B. The Right to Life
Violence against women in the family, particularly intimate
partner violence, has been recognized as a leading cause of death
and suffering around the world.120 Honor killings are an extreme
example where women are killed with deliberate intent for per-
ceived transgressions of family, community, or religious norms.
In many communities, one such norm is a man’s right to have
sex with his wife, whether she consents or not.121
Marital rape can have distinct health consequences harboring
right to life implications such as miscarriages, fistulas, bladder
infections, and potential contraction of sexually transmitted dis-
eases including HIV that can have fatal outcomes.122 Even in re-
gions where there may be no outright community pressure on
women to sexually “please” their men, the fear of domestic vio-
lence and physical harm can force women to accede to unwanted
sex.123 In extreme cases, marital rape has also been connected to
“marital murder” as men kill their wives, often with impunity
under various defenses, such as “defense of honor” or “crime of
passion” as when a battered wife tries to escape her daily vio-
lence.124 Therefore, marital rape violates the right to life, both
on its own terms, and as an expression of domestic violence.
The right to life is a fundamental right guaranteed by all hu-
man rights treaties and is a part of customary international law.
The inherent right to life protected by law is a non-derogable
right recognized in the ICCPR in Article 6.125 The Human Rights
Committee identifies violence against women as a threat to the
120. VAW STUDY, supra note 27, at iii, 43–45.
121. Rhonda Copelon, Intimate Terror: Understanding Domestic Violence as
Torture, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES 116, 128 (Rebecca J. Cook ed., 1994); see also Melissa Spatz, A
Lesser Crime: A Comparative Study of Legal Defenses for Men Who Kill Their
Wives, 24 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 597 (1991).
122. World Health Organization [WHO], Understanding and Addressing Vi-
olence Against Women: Sexual Violence, WHO/RHR/12.37, at 6 (2012),
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/77434/1/WHO_RHR_12.37_eng.pdf;
Bergen, supra note 118.
123. World Health Organization, supra note 122, at 3.
124. Sue Lees, Marital Rape and Marital Murder, in HOME TRUTHS ABOUT
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: FEMINIST INFLUENCES ON POLICY AND PRACTICE 57 (Jalna
Hanmer & Catherine Itzin eds., 2000).
125. ICCPR, supra note 96, art. 6.
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right to life.126 The Human Rights Committee’s General Com-
ment 28 on the equality of rights between men and women man-
dates that states report on the specific measures taken to protect
women from practices that violate their right to life.127 Any ac-
tion by a non-state actor which is condoned by the state and re-
sults in the violation of the right to life must be subject to the
strictest sanctions, in other words, criminal sanctions. Rape has
been legally recognized as a violation of the right to life128 and
rape in a spousal relationship, by extension, violates that right.
Criminalization of marital rape, therefore, is an essential ele-
ment of the state’s obligation to protect women from practices
that violate their right to life.
The recognition that rape violates a victim’s right to life is
found not only in international law but also in some domestic
jurisprudence as well. The Indian Supreme Court has found
126. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations on Colombia, UN
Doc A/52/40, para. 287 (1997); U.N. Human Rights Comm., Concluding Obser-
vations on Peru, UN Doc A/52/40, para. 167 (1997). In several concluding ob-
servations, the Human Rights Committee has specifically demanded that the
member states criminalize marital rape. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Con-
cluding Observations on Sri Lanka, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/79/LKA, para. 20
(2003). The U.N. Human Rights Committee is drafting a General Comment 36
on Article 6 that is expected to explicitly identify domestic and sexual violence
as violations of women’s right to life. SeeHuman Rights Committee Developing
New Right to Life General Comment, INT’L JUST. RESOURCE CTR. (July 28,
2015), http://www.ijrcenter.org/2015/07/28/human-rights-committee-develop-
ing-new-right-to-life-general-comment/.
127. U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 28: Article 3 (The
Equality of Rights Between Men and Women), para. 10, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10 (Mar. 29, 2000) [hereinafter General Comment No.
28].
128. For example, in Prosecutor v. Akayesu, the ICTR, while finding rape to
be a crime against humanity, stated that “[s]exual violence was a step in the
process of destruction [of the Tutsi group]––destruction of the spirit, of the will
to live, and of life itself.” Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 731 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for Rwanda, Sept. 2, 1998). Acts of sexual violence are also accompanied
by explicit threats of death violating the right to life. Domestic violence in gen-
eral has been found to implicate the right to life in cases where the state has
not fulfilled its positive obligations to respond to domestic violence complaints
and adopt preventive operational measures to protect the individuals whose
life is put at risk by the violence. See Opuz v. Turkey, App. No. 33401/02, Eur.
Ct. H.R. (2009), http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardset-
ting/minjust/mju29/CASE%20OF%20OPUZ%20v%5B1%5D.%20TURKEY.pdf
; Lenahan v. United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No.
80/11, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.142, doc. 11 (2011).
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rape to be a crime against basic human rights that violates the
victim’s “most cherished fundamental right, namely, the right to
life.”129 Regional adjudicating bodies have found dereliction by
the state to effectively protect against domestic violence a viola-
tion of the right to life, since ignoring domestic violence in any
form can lead to death.130 As a fundamental human rights norm,
the legal protection of the right to life demands a criminal rem-
edy for effective deterrence and prosecution of marital rape.
C. The Right to Liberty and Security of Person
Marital rape is a violation of the physical and psychological
security of the person and bears implications on the full and
equal enjoyment of the right to liberty of women within their
homes. The right to liberty and security is ensured under Article
9 of the ICCPR.131 The right to “security” is often expressed to-
gether with a right to “liberty” and has been protected since the
French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of
1789.132 This right is provided for by Articles 3 and 9 of the
UDHR as well as in several regional instruments and has been
used in various fora as encompassing criminal prohibition of
spousal rape.133
129. Bodhisattwa Gautam v. Subhra Chakraborty, (1996) 1 SCC 490 (India).
Yet, in India, marital rape is not criminalized. SeeMalavika Vyawahare, India:
Court Rules that Marital Sex, Even When Forced is not Rape, N.Y. TIMES, May
13, 2014, at A7; Bharti Jain, House Panel Backs Move Not to Treat Marital
Rape as Sexual Offence, TIMES OF INDIA (Mar. 2, 2013, 5:27 AM), http://timeso-
findia.indiatimes.com/india/House-panel-backs-move-not-to-treat-marital-
rape-as-sexual-offence/articleshow/18759230.cms. The Parliamentary commit-
tee that was to review the government’s decision to not criminalize marital
rape, inter alia, supported the action stating that “if marital rape is brought
under the law, the entire family system will be under great stress and the com-
mittee may perhaps be doing more injustice.” Id. The Supreme Court has not
yet ruled on marital rape.
130. Opuz, App. No. 33401/02, Eur. Ct. H.R.; Lenahan, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.142,
doc. 11 ¶125; Maria Da Penha v. Brazil, Case 12.051, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R.,
Report No. 54/01, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.111, doc. 20 rev. (2001).
131. ICCPR, supra note 96, art. 9; Convention Against Torture, supra note
96.
132. James Spigelman AC, C.J. N.S.W, The Forgotten Freedom: Freedom
from Fear, 59 INT’L&COMP. L.Q. 543, 549 (2010).
133. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Comm.
No. 2/2003, Ms. A. T. v. Hungary, ¶ 9.3, CEDAW/C/36/D/2/2003 (Jan. 26, 2005)
(stating that the state’s inadequate response to domestic violence constituted
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However, the ICCPR Article 9 right has had only limited use
since it was interpreted in 1982 by the Human Rights Commit-
tee as being limited only to state action and primarily in the area
of criminal detention.134 Since its four paragraphs provide little
guidance on the other issues raised by Article 9, the Committee,
in 2012, began a process of drafting a new General Comment.135
General Comment 35 on Article 9 was finally formalized on De-
cember 16, 2014.136 It states that the right to security of a person
mandates that state parties must “respond appropriately” to
patterns of violence against women, including domestic vio-
lence.137
Sexual violence and the possibility of further sexual assaults
in an ongoing relationship leave the victim under the continuous
a “violation of the author’s human rights and fundamental freedoms, particu-
larly her right to security of person”) (emphasis added); Rep. of the Comm. on
the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women on its Exceptional Session,
transmitted by Letter Dated 15 September 2002 from the Chairperson of the
Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women to the General
Assembly, at 195 paras. 333–334, U.N. Doc. No. A/57/38 (2002) [hereinafter
CEDAW Report] (“The Committee remains concerned that the Hungarian Pe-
nal Code currently treats sexual crimes as crimes against decency rather than
violations of women’s rights to bodily security. It is particularly concerned that
the definition of rape, including that within marriage, is based on the use of
force rather than the lack of consent . . . . The Committee recommends that the
State party reform its law to define sexual crimes as crimes involving violations
of women’s rights to bodily security and that the State party define the crime
of rape as sexual intercourse without consent.”) (emphasis added); S v. Baloyi
2000 (2) SA 425 (CC) at para. 11 (S. Afr.) (“[S]erious threats to security of the
person arise from private sources. [The section of the Constitution protecting
the right to security] has to be understood as obliging the state directly to pro-
tect the right of everyone to be free from private or domestic violence.”); INTER-
AM. COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, MESOAMERICA REPORT, supra note 71, paras.
48, 124 (“[T]he right being protected [by laws criminalizing sexual violence un-
der all conditions] is sexual self‐determination and sexual security.”) (emphasis
added).
134. U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 8: Article 9 (Right
to Liberty and Security of Persons), at 8, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (June 30,
1982).
135. Int’l Just. Resource Ctr.,UNHuman Rights Committee Invites Feedback
On Draft General Comment No. 35 On The Rights To Liberty And Security Of
Person (Apr. 14, 2014), http://www.ijrcenter.org/2014/04/14/un-human-rights-
committee-invites-feedback-on-draft-general-comment-no-35-on-the-rights-to-
liberty-and-security-of-person/.
136. U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 35: Article 9
(Liberty and Security of Persons), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/35 (Dec. 16, 2014).
137. Id. para. 9.
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threat of a repeat attack, as the perpetrator is someone most
likely to be living under the same roof with her, who may be the
father of her children, and who may be the sole economic pro-
vider in the household. In countries where marital rape is not
criminalized, the perpetrator may also be the man sanctioned by
society and law to have sex with the victim whenever he feels
like it. This creates a legal space where a woman’s right to lib-
erty and to security of the person can be invaded with impunity.
Sexual assault laws, which are underinclusive and exempt
rape in marriage, legitimize the idea that women cannot refuse
consent to sex in marriage and therefore put women in situa-
tions where they continuously live with a sense of vulnerability
and loss of rights to both bodily and sexual integrity. In this con-
text, a woman sexually assaulted in marriage is left without any
remedy, and should she elect to leave her abuser, she may be
stigmatized, face poverty, lose custody of her children, and face
the possibility of continued threats of violence from her hus-
band.138
Not only is such a victim in a profoundly powerless situation
where her right to liberty and security is threatened in her eve-
ryday life, but she is also more prone to disbelief by many around
her, especially the legal and police systems, should she disclose
rape perpetrated by her husband or other male intimate. She
may even be held responsible for the attacks she has endured.139
Victims of marital rape face an increased vulnerability to all the
same stereotypes that rape victims face in general, such as social
prejudices about the perpetrators which minimize the harms of
sexual violence in relationships (i.e. he is a good husband so long
as he brings in the money and does not beat too much) or about
women as less credible (i.e. that they frequently make false alle-
gations of rape).140 Without criminalization of marital rape, the
law leaves a woman’s right to bodily security and liberty sacri-
ficed to other interests, such as gendered notions of “family
138. See Cries Unheard, supra note 25.
139. Id. at 4.
140. Id. at 5–6, 13. See generally Jill E. Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal
History of Marital Rape, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1373 (2000); Jo Fidgen, Zambia’s Ce-
lebrity Couple Reveal Wife-Beating Past, BBC NEWS,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8375291.stm (last updated Nov. 30, 2009, 7:45
AM).
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unity” and “family peace” and unmitigated support for the hus-
band as the “bread-winner.”141 Safeguarding women’s rights to
liberty and security of the person, therefore, necessarily imposes
specific obligations on states to criminalize marital rape.
D. The Right to be Free from Discrimination
The right to be free from discrimination is also established in
all the major human rights treaties. Indeed, freedom from dis-
crimination is a raison d’etre of the legal protection of human
rights. It is also defined in Article 1 of CEDAW, and it is a jus
cogens principle of customary international law.142 Noncriminal-
ization of marital rape implies discriminatory treatment in two
ways: it discriminates between violence experienced by women
and other types of violence and it discriminates between violence
experienced in the private sphere and the public sphere (by dis-
criminating between nonmarital rape and intimate partner
rape).
The link between violence against women and gender discrim-
ination is well established and accepted. In 1992, through its
General Recommendation 19, the CEDAW Committee estab-
lished that gender-based violence is “violence that is directed
against a woman because she is a woman or that affects women
disproportionately.”143 It further recognized that it “is a form of
discrimination that seriously inhibits women’s ability to enjoy
rights and freedoms on a basis of equality with men.”144 General
Recommendation 19 states that gender-based violence is a form
of discrimination on the basis that violence directed against a
woman purely because she is a woman and gender-based vio-
lence affects women disproportionately. The obligation of state
141. Heenan, supra note 14; see also Rashida Manjoo (Special Rapporteur on
Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences), Promotion and Pro-
tection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, Including the Right to Development, para. 50, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/49
(May 14, 2013); Jain, supra note 129. See generallyMelisa J. Anderson, Lawful
Wife, Unlawful Sex––Examining the Effect of the Criminalization of Marital
Rape in England and the Republic of Ireland, 27 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 139
(1998).
142. CEDAW, supra note 96, art. 1; Juridical Condition and Rights of the
Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) No. 18, ¶¶ 97–101 (Sept. 17, 2003).
143. General Recommendation 19, supra note 42, art. 6.
144. Id. arts. 1, 6.
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parties to address violence against women includes violence per-
petrated by “any person, organization or enterprise.”145
To give effect to their obligations, state parties to CEDAW
must undertake comprehensive measures to end discrimination
against women through laws, policies, and commitments by
state institutions.146 State parties to CEDAW are bound to en-
sure the equal protection of women by the law. Article 2(c) re-
quires states “to establish legal protection of the rights of women
on an equal basis with men and to ensure through competent
national tribunals and other public institutions the effective pro-
tection of women against any act of discrimination.”147
The U.N. Human Rights Committee has recognized that the
gender-specific nature of domestic violence requires that it be
classified as a violation of the human right to equality.148 Since
intimate partner sexual assault and violence against women in
general impair or nullify the enjoyment of economic, social, and
cultural rights, these forms of discrimination implicate the
rights under ICESCR as well.149
A U.N. Special Rapporteur report asserts that as per the due
diligence obligation to eliminate gender discrimination, “States
are required to use the same level of commitment in relation to
prevention, investigation, punishment and provision of remedies
for violence against women as they do with regards to the other
forms of violence.”150 Further, “the State, by failing to respond to
intimate/domestic violence, can be held responsible for not ful-
filling its obligation to protect and punish in a non-discrimina-
tory way and can be charged as an accomplice to private viola-
tion.”151 Criminalizing sexual and physical violence in all its
forms has long been recognized by the CEDAWCommittee, U.N.
Special Rapporteurs on violence against women, and several
145. Id. art 9.
146. CEDAW, supra note 96, art. 2(a)–(g).
147. Id. art. 2(c) (emphasis added).
148. General Comment No. 28, supra note 127, para. 10.
149. U.N. Comm. on Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. On Econ., Soc. & Cultural
Rights, General Comment No. 16, para. 27, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2005/4 (Aug. 11,
2005).
150. Ertürk, supra note 53, para. 35.
151. The failure furthermore maintains “a separate regime of responsibility
for private as opposed to public acts.” Id. para. 61.
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U.N. bodies as essential remedies for combatting gender dis-
crimination and providing women with equal protection under
the law.
The current U.N. Special Rapporteur on violence against
women, Rashida Manjoo, points to the discriminatory treatment
of spousal violence in many member states.152 Even in countries
where spousal violence is a criminal offence, it is often tried as a
misdemeanor, categorized as a minor offence, and the police typ-
ically do not take reports of spousal violence seriously.153 How-
ever, the due diligence standard requires that states impose “se-
vere” and effective sanctions against spousal violence to prevent
future conduct “because of the ongoing nature of the relationship
between victim and perpetrator.”154 The previous Special Rap-
porteur confirmed that the criminalization of domestic and inti-
mate partner violence is a specific requirement under the Bei-
jing Platform and was a “minimum standard.”155
In Maria da Penha v. Brazil, the IACHR found that by allow-
ing perpetrators of domestic violence to enjoy impunity with no
threat of prosecution or punishment, not only was Brazil com-
plicit in the crime, but Brazil’s failure to respond to domestic vi-
olence was evidence of gender discrimination.156 The Council of
Europe and the EU have consistently reiterated that violence
against women, including intimate partner sexual assault, is a
form of discrimination that requires adequate criminal reme-
dies.157 A state’s failure to criminalize or adequately criminalize
marital rape, therefore, is necessarily a form of discrimination
against women.
152. Manjoo, supra note 141.
153. Id. para. 50.
154. Id. para. 74.
155. Yakin Ertürk (Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its
Causes and Consequences), U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm’n on Human
Rights, Rep. on Violence Against Women, Indicators on Violence against
women and State response, UN Doc A/HRC/7/6, paras 71, 78, 81 (Jan. 29,
2008).
156. Maria Da Penha v. Brazil, Case 12.051, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report
No. 54/01, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.111, doc. 20 rev. ¶ 55–56 (2001).
157. Istanbul Convention (CAHVIO), supra note 78, pmbl., art. 3(a); Council
of Europe Comm. of Ministers, Recommendation Rec (2002)5 of the Committee
of Ministers to Member States on the Protection of Women Against Violence,
app. para. 34 (Apr. 30, 2002), https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=280915 [here-
inafter Rec (2002)5]; 2009 Resolution, supra note 81, pmbl., art. 1; Council
Directive 2012/29, supra note 85, art. 17.
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E. The Right to Equality in the Family
In a society or culture that negates a woman’s right to give or
refuse consent for sex in marriage there can be no real gender
equality. Assuming that for a woman marriage necessarily im-
plies her ongoing consent to sex with her spouse, is tantamount
to treating her as a form of sexual property of the husband. In
countries where marital rape is condoned or not legally prohib-
ited, therefore, women’s rights to equality within the family are
violated in multiple ways.
In some contexts, the social and legal acceptance of marital
rape is so strong that if a perpetrator marries the woman he
raped, the marital rape exemption applies retroactively, and the
assault is nullified. Penal codes in Venezuela, Indonesia, Came-
roon, Chad, Denmark, and Russia state that if a woman is raped,
and the perpetrator marries the victim, he will be pardoned or
his sentence will be reduced.158 Not only is this based on the mis-
ogynistic belief that a woman is “damaged goods” if she is raped
outside of marriage but it also simultaneously supports the be-
lief that sexual violence within a marriage is not rape.
Laws that entrench gender inequality by making the husband
the head of the household, as is the case in Iran, Chile, Rwanda,
Honduras, Gabon, Indonesia, United Arab Emirates, Peru, and
the Philippines among others,159 necessarily increase the vulner-
ability of women to sexual assault within their homes. If a
woman in this situation is derelict in her “wifely duties,” the so-
cietal norms and even the laws, provide the husband with the
right to inflict emotional and physical violence on her. Faced
with the threat of such emotional and physical violence, the wife
has no choice but to obey the sexual demands of her husband.
158. AMNESTY INT’L, THE STATE OF THE WORLD’S HUMAN RIGHTS 82 (2013);
Morgan McDaniel, From Morocco to Denmark: Rape Survivors Around the
World Are Forced to Marry Attackers, WOMEN UNDER SIEGE PROJECT (May 2,
2013), http://www.womenundersiegeproject.org/blog/entry/from-morocco-to-
denmark-rape-survivors-around-the-world-are-forced-to-marry; Radhika Coo-
maraswamy (Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and
Consequences), Cultural Practices in the Family that Are Violent Towards
Women, para. 58, U.N. Doc E/CN.4/2002/83 (Jan. 31, 2002).
159. THE WORLD BANK AND IFC, WOMEN, BUSINESS AND THE LAW: REMOVING
RESTRICTIONS TO ENHANCE GENDER EQUALITY 16 tbl.2.2 (2013),
http://wbl.worldbank.org/~/me-
dia/FPDKM/WBL/Documents/Reports/2014/Women-Business-and-the-Law-
2014-Key-Findings.pdf.
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U.N. Special Rapporteur Coomaraswamy notes in her report
that multiple “forms of threat or violence are used to ensure that
women stay obedient within a marriage, for example the threat
of the husband taking another wife or of divorce . . . .”160
Marital rape also implicates the equality rights and protection
of girls. When culturally permitted and mandated, marital rape
has a pernicious impact on the health of women and girls. In a
July 2009 report on violence against women in Afghanistan, the
U.N. noted that “[e]arly and forced marriages are . . . particu-
larly conducive to marital rape, including of very young girls.”161
There are other examples where the culture condones or sup-
ports marital intercourse even where there is no explicit con-
sent.162
Inequality in a marital relationship and gender inequality in
a society in general are the most important factors contributing
to marital rape, which in turn exacerbates inequality.163 State
parties are required by CEDAW to
modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and
women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices
and customary and all other practices which are based on the
idea of inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on
stereotyped roles for men and women.164
The criminalization of marital rape at least partially disrupts
this perpetuation of gender inequality by challenging the idea
that women are the sexual property of men in a marriage and by
sending a strong signal that marriage is based on equality be-
tween spouses. Furthermore, criminalizing marital rape legally
protects a woman’s right to give or withhold consent to sex
160. Coomaraswamy, supra note 158, para. 63.
161. U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan & Office of the U.N. High
Comm’r for Human Rights, Silence is Violence : End the Abuse of Women in
Afghanistan 22 (July 8, 2009), http://www.ohchr.org/Docu-
ments/Press/VAW_Report_7July09.pdf.
162. McDaniel, supra note 158 (providing examples from Morocco, Denmark,
Latin America, and the Arab World where women were forced to marry their
rapists to legitimize the rape through marriage); Jain, supra note 129 (noting
the Indian Parliamentary Committee ruled that in India, “the [f]amily is able
to resolve the problems . . . and if the marital rape is brought under the law,
the entire family system will be under great stress and the Committee may
perhaps be doing more injustice”).
163. See generally Manjoo, supra note 141; Coomaraswamy, supra note 158;
Ertürk, supra note 53.
164. CEDAW, supra note 96, art. 5.
194 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 41:1
within a marriage. Therefore, criminalizing marital rape is es-
sential for states to carry out their obligations to uphold equality
in the family.
F. The Right to Health and Well Being
Marital rape represents a violation of the right to the highest
standard attainable of physical and mental health as protected
by the UDHR and the ICESR. In addition to the psychological
trauma that can lead to anxiety, shock, intense fear, depression,
suicidal ideation, and post-traumatic stress, marital rape can
have specific health consequences such as miscarriages, still-
births, bladder infections, infertility, and the potential contrac-
tion of sexually transmitted diseases including HIV.165
Women’s groups in South Africa have campaigned for the crim-
inalization of marital rape on the platform that condoning mar-
ital rape seriously undermines efforts to combat the horrifying
HIV-AIDS pandemic particularly affecting African women.166
Victims of marital rape and domestic violence not only have an
increased risk in contracting the disease but are also under-
mined in their ability to access healthcare and treatment for this
disease.
Gendered violence has long been recognized to be associated
with very heavy costs, not only to the women victimized, but also
to society as a whole. These include costs associated with dam-
age to women’s physical and mental health, loss of employment,
and diminished productivity. This has been recognized by the
WHO, the U.N., and various national governments, research
bodies, individual scholars, and NGOs the world over.167
165. WHOREPORT, supra note 9.
166. Nada Ali, The Costs of Marital Rape in Southern Africa, HUM. RTS.
WATCH (Aug. 19, 2008), http://www.hrw.org/news/2008/08/18/costs-marital-
rape-southern-africa.
167. See, e.g., NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, COSTS OF
INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES (2003),
http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/ipvbook-a.pdf; Council of Europe,
Gender Equal. & Violence Against Women Div., Overview of Studies on the
Costs of Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence 1, 7 (Oct. 26, 2012);
World Health Organization [WHO], Economic Dimensions of Interpersonal Vi-
olence (Hugh Waters et al., 2004) http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publica-
tions/2004/9241591609.pdf; Karuna S. Chibber & Suneeta Krishnan, Confront-
ing Intimate Partner Violence, A Global Healthcare Priority, 78 MT. SINAI J.
MED. 449 (2011).
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General Comment 14 to Article 12 of the ICESCR on the right
to the highest attainable standard of health by the Committee
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) asserts that
a major goal of states should be reducing women’s health risks
by protecting women from domestic violence, which includes sex-
ual violence. The failure to protect women against violence, and
to criminalize and to prosecute perpetrators of marital rape,
therefore, is a violation of a state’s obligation to protect women’s
right to health.168
IV. WHY CRIMINALIZING SEXUAL ASSAULT IN INTIMATE
RELATIONSHIPS ISNECESSARY TO PROTECTWOMEN’SHUMAN
RIGHTS
Existing international law now unambiguously requires that
states criminalize marital rape. This is because, as is clear from
a review of human rights law and norms, marital rape violates
a range of fundamental human rights that are protected by in-
ternational law. Criminalization is a crucial way in which the
law’s power must be drawn upon to prohibit and prevent these
rights violations.
The U.N. Special Rapporteur on violence against women
acknowledges the debate in the human rights community that
an emphasis on education and health strategies may be more
productive than legal sanctions.169 Nevertheless, the Special
Rapporteur is emphatic about the particular efficacy of penal
sanctions, especially in the role of securing a reduction in vio-
lence within “a generation.”170 Specifically, the Special Rappor-
teur states,
It is often argued that the human rights approach, with its em-
phasis on law and punishment, may not be very productive in
fighting violence against women on the ground. Many activists
feel that the emphasis should be placed on education and
health strategies that combat attitudes over the long term.
However, history does have examples of how strong and effec-
tive laws have eliminated certain practices within a matter of
years . . . . The existence of a criminal sanction ensures that
168. U.N. Comm. on Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. On Econ., Soc. & Cultural
Rights, General Comment No. 14, U.N. Comm. on Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm.
On Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 16, para. 27, U.N.
Doc. E/C.12/2005/4 (Aug. 11, 2005).
169. Coomaraswamy, supra note 158, para. 113.
170. Id. para. 112.
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parents have an excuse to spare their child such a practice. The
law allows parents a way to avoid giving in to social pressure
and custom. Without such a law, it is difficult to eradicate a
practice in a generation.171
More recently, the Special Rapporteur has also called for a le-
gally binding global treaty for the elimination of violence against
women, as a measure necessary to promote and protect gender
equality.172 As the Rapporteur emphasizes,
Transformative change requires that the words and actions of
States’ reflects the acknowledgement that violence against
women is a human rights violation, in and of itself; and more
importantly it requires a commitment by States’ to be bound
by specific legal obligations in the quest for elimination of this
pervasive and widespread human rights violation.173
A. What Does Criminalization Require? Legal Repudiation of
the Idea of Implied or Continuous Consent
Criminalization of rape in spousal and other intimate relation-
ships requires more than simply the removal of the marital-rape
exemption. It also requires that there be no presumption of con-
sent in the definition of rape in a marital (or marital type) con-
text and that lack of consent be an essential element of the crim-
inalization. According the CEDAW Committee, definitions of
rape, including rape within marriage, that are based merely on
use of force rather than lack of consent fail to satisfy state’s ob-
ligations to ensure that women’s rights to bodily security remain
protected.174
The international law governing the elements of sexual vio-
lence crimes is particularly important to the project of criminal-
izing rape in marriage. Rule 70 of the International Criminal
Court (ICC) Rules of Procedure and Evidence states the follow-
ing with respect to sexual violence:
171. Id.
172. UN Expert Calls for a Legally Binding Global Treaty for the Elimination
of Violence Against Women, OFF. OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUM. RTS.
(Oct. 27, 2014),
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=152
11&LangID=E.
173. Id.
174. CEDAW Report, supra note 133.
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(a) Consent cannot be inferred by reason of any words or con-
duct of a victim where force, threat of force, coercion or taking
advantage of a coercive environment undermined the victim’ s
ability to give voluntary and genuine consent;
(b) Consent cannot be inferred by reason of any words or con-
duct of a victim where the victim is incapable of giving genuine
consent;
(c) Consent cannot be inferred by reason of the silence of, or
lack of resistance by, a victim to the alleged sexual violence.175
In other words, these rules indicate that where a victim is inca-
pable of giving genuine consent, as in a context where the com-
munity and the state condones marital rape, consent simply can-
not be inferred by the relational context.
A presumption of the ongoing existence of consent in a marital
relationship is also a violation of a woman’s right to sexual au-
tonomy and security. In fact, given the inequality of power in
many marital relationships, especially where a wife is often
faced with the ongoing threat of violence, dishonor or stigma, re-
moval of economic support and shelter, polygamy, and other so-
cietal pressures, having a requirement of affirmative consent is
arguably the only way that her universal right to security and
liberty is protected.
Not only must statutory change in criminal laws be enacted to
remove exemptions of sexual assaults perpetrated in marital-
type relationships, but also a vigorous campaign of judicial and
public education must be undertaken to raise awareness about
the criminal wrongfulness of sexual violence and coercion within
marriages. These sociolegal educational initiatives must also in-
clude the norms of gender equality and women’s rights to say no
to unwanted sex, which is, of course, a precondition for a genuine
capacity to give consent.
The manner in which marital rape is criminalized also mat-
ters. Criminalization requires that marital rape be recognized
as a crime against the liberty and security of the individual. In-
stead, many countries have deficient protections because they
175. Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the Int’l Criminal
Court, 1st Sess., 1st mtg. at 44 r. 70, Doc. No. ICC-ASP/1/3 (Sept. 10, 2002),
http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/603/35/PDF/N0260335.pdf?OpenElement.
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categorize rape under crimes against morality or honor.176 The
Hungarian Penal Code, for example, defines rape and other
crimes of sexual violence as “crimes against marriage, the fam-
ily, youth and sexual morality.”177 Incest laws in Mexico, even
where the victim is underage, fall under the rubric of crimes
against the family and not against the physical integrity of the
victim.178 These types of legal prohibitions are inadequate and
fail to achieve the full criminalization of sexual assault in gen-
eral and sexual assault in marriage specifically.
Such morality-based categorizations not only have implica-
tions for making the law meaningful and effective but also have
implications in ensuring that the specific right that marital rape
violates (i.e. right to liberty and security) is protected. If marital
rape is deemed to violate the physical integrity of the victim, it
is a violation of the victim’s right to personal security. Therefore
it is simply not sufficient to categorize the prohibition against
sexual assault as a morality-based sanction.
From an instrumentalist perspective, such a categorization
renders the criminalization meaningless. As Amnesty Interna-
tional has pointed out, it increases the pressure on a victim to
remain silent for fear that her complaint against her husband
can disrupt the morality norms of her community and bring
“shame” to her extended family.179
The Council of Europe has therefore recommended that mem-
ber states must “ensure that criminal law provides that any act
of violence against a person, in particular physical or sexual vi-
olence, constitutes a violation of that person’s physical, psycho-
logical and/or sexual freedom and integrity, and not solely a vio-
lation ofmorality, honor or decency.”180 The CEDAW Committee
176. See, e.g., Amnesty Int’l, “I Can’t Afford Justice”: Violence against Women
in Uganda Unchecked and Unpunished, AI Index AFR 59/001/2010 (Apr. 7,
2010); Cries Unheard, supra note 25, at 7; Afghanistan: Surge in Women Jailed
for ‘Moral Crimes’, HUM. RTS. WATCH (May 21, 2013),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/05/21/afghanistan-surge-women-jailed-moral-
crimes.
177. Cries Unheard, supra note 25, at 7 (emphasis added).
178. Marianne Mollmann, Ending Impunity for Rape, WASH. POST (Dec. 27,
2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/arti-
cle/2008/12/26/AR2008122601493.html; see also INTER-AM. COMM’N ONHUMAN
RIGHTS, MESOAMERICAREPORT, supra note 71.
179. Cries Unheard, supra note 25, at 3–4, 22.
180. Rec (2002)5, supra note 157, app. para. 34.
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has similarly asserted that sexual crimes, particularly in inti-
mate relationships, be treated as violations of women’s rights to
bodily security instead of as crimes defending moral viola-
tions.181 Treating sexual crimes in intimate relationships the
same way as other sexual crimes without any allusions to cul-
tural values and morality, as is demanded by international hu-
man rights law, requires the unconditional criminalization of
marital rape.
CONCLUSION
In spite of decades of advocacy, scholarship, community organ-
izing, and law reform across jurisdictions, violence against
women remains a major social problem. It is both a significant
impediment to women’s equality and a major breach of women’s
human rights. Sexual assaults perpetrated against women by
male intimates are among the more intransigent and privatized
expressions of this violence that remain largely beyond the reach
of the law in too many nation states.
Too many criminal justice systems across the world either
grant legal impunity for marital rape by upholding an exemption
for sexual assault in marriage or by treating marital rape cases
that do get processed criminally, as if they are somehow funda-
mentally different from, and less serious than, other sexual as-
saults.182 In either case, women who are sexually violated by
men who are their husbands or intimate partners are left unpro-
tected by the law.
Though unevenly progressing, there is a developing interna-
tional trend towards extending criminal law’s reach to cover sex-
ual assaults in marriage and marital type relationships. How-
ever, even in countries that have criminalized marital rape,
there remain formidable social, cultural, and legal barriers to
achieving criminal justice for women who have experienced this
form of assault in an intimate relationship.183 Furthermore, far
181. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Conclud-
ing Comments of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women: Hungary, 39th Sess, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/HUN/CO/6, paras. 20–21
(Aug. 10, 2007).
182. See supra Part I.A.
183. For an example of one such country where marital rape is criminalized
but formidable barriers to achieving criminal justice for women remain, see
Jennifer Koshan, The Legal Treatment of Marital Rape and Women’s Equality:
An Analysis of the Canadian Experience, EQUALITY EFFECT, Sept. 2010,
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too many countries fail to even recognize rape in marriage as a
crime, let alone as a human rights violation. For example, on
April 1, 2014, Lebanon’s parliament passed legislation entitled
“Law on Protection of Women and Family Members fromDomes-
tic Violence.”184 The law, many years in the making, is intended
to provide some legal remedies to women harmed in their
spousal relationships, yet it specifically and deliberately fails to
criminalize marital rape. Instead, the law rather astonishingly
endorses what is described as a “marital right of intercourse.”185
This legal legitimation of marital rape continues to be the sub-
ject of vigorous debate and protest by women’s and other human
rights organizations.186
In countries where marital rape is not criminalized, the laws
effectively facilitate and condone sexual assault in marriage.
They do so by removing women’s rights to choose to either con-
sent or not consent to sexual contact, they remove legal remedies
for sexual violence perpetrated in intimate relationships, and
they immunize perpetrators from legal sanctions for sexual vio-
lence perpetrated in these relationships. Simply put, when rape
in marriage is not criminalized, the rape laws of that country do
not apply to married women. As a result, women who are mar-
ried are stripped of fundamental legal protections and basic hu-
man rights afforded to other women. Married women in coun-
tries that fail to criminalize marital rape are denied equal bene-
fit and protection of the law, equal citizenship rights, and denied
full and equal participation in social, economic, and domestic
life.187
Criminalizing rape within marriage or marital-like relation-
ships is not the only remedy for this form of violence against
women, nor should it be the sole focus of efforts to end this form
http://theequalityeffect.org/pdfs/maritalrapecanadexperience.pdf (discussing
the situation in Canada). See also Randall, supra note 22.
184. Lebanon: Domestic Violence Law Good, but Incomplete, HUM. RTS.
WATCH (Apr. 3, 2014), https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/04/03/lebanon-domes-
tic-violence-law-good-incomplete.
185. Id; see also Ellie Violet Bramley, Why does Lebanese Bill on Domestic
Violence Fail to Tackle Marital Rape?, GUARDIAN (Apr. 9, 2014),
http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/apr/09/lebanese-bill-
domestic-violence-marital-rape.
186. Dana Halawi, Activists Urge Lebanon to Make Marital Rape Illegal,
REUTERS (Mar. 23, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/23/us-leba-
non-women-abuse-idUSKBN0MJ0GY20150323.
187. See discussion supra Part III.
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of gendered violence. Nor is it an adequate response on the part
of the state or of society more broadly. However, it is an essential
remedy and a crucially important legal response.
Criminalization strategies in relation to violence against
women have been vigorously pursued, while simultaneously be-
ing the occasional subject of debate, especially within feminist
academic circles. The merits and perils of criminalization have
been most strenuously argued in relation to domestic violence,
particularly with regard to some of the unintended consequences
associated with a criminalization strategy for this form of rela-
tional violence.188
While the criminal justice system remains a deeply imperfect
system, and criminalization can sometimes be associated with
certain perils and unintended consequences, criminal law sanc-
tions prohibiting sexual violence against women in intimate re-
lationships are nevertheless of paramount importance and must
be implemented. Their absence signals that women in marriage
and other marriage-like relationships have no legal protection
against violence of a sexual nature perpetrated against them.
The use of criminal law is a necessary, if incomplete, part of the
strategy to end this form of gendered violence and human rights
violation, as it is necessary to ending violence against women
more generally.
Criminalization specifically, and law reform in general, can
only form a part of the solution of addressing the complex prob-
lem of marital rape. Public education and awareness efforts,
shifts in attitudes, professional training and education about ap-
propriate system responses, adequate victim services, and sex-
ual violence prevention efforts are also needed to combat marital
rape. Additionally, any and all other legal and social supports
for gender inequality in marriage must be removed.
On this front, perhaps most fundamentally crucial in address-
ing the problem of marital rape is a challenge to the ideology of
masculine dominance in marriage and in society, and the rejec-
tion of any notion that men are “head” of the family or household
and are thus entitled to authority over women by virtue of their
status as men. This speaks to the way in which the criminaliza-
188. See, e.g., Kristin Bumiller, Feminist Collaboration with the State in Re-
sponse to Sexual Violence, in GENDER, VIOLENCE, AND HUMAN SECURITY:
CRITICAL FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 191 (Aili Mari Tripp et al. eds., 2013).
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tion of marital rape must be part of a broader challenge to gen-
der inequality in general, and, in particular, to its embeddedness
in familial and intimate relationships. In those societies, reli-
gions, and cultures where the superiority of men and the subor-
dination of women is assumed and legitimized, this challenge
will be fundamental and profound. But that is not a reason to
shy away from it. Indeed, it makes the challenge all the more
imperative if we are to eliminate the violation of women’s human
rights and work to achieve substantive equality.
Nevertheless, given that the criminalization of sexual violence
against women within intimate relationships is an important
component of broader efforts to ensure women’s rights to safety,
bodily integrity, autonomy, and equality, international legal in-
struments and covenants can and must play an important role
in developing effective criminal law responses to rape in mar-
riage. The protection of women’s fundamental human rights re-
quires it. As part of this project, states are therefore legally ob-
ligated to prosecute the sexual violation of women by their male
intimate partners, by engaging the power of criminal law to stop
this form of gendered violence and human rights violation.
